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COMMENT
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: CLOSING THE
DOOR TO A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF SEXUAL PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney' the Supreme Court
affirmed a federal three-judge court's decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of a Virginia sodomy statute' which, on its face,
criminalized oral and anal sex between members of the same or
opposite sex, married or unmarried. The affirmance without
opinion of the lower court decision is a setback for those who had
hoped the Court would take the logical step from its historic
holdings in Griswold v. Connecticut3 and Eisenstadt v. Baird4 and
accord constitutional status to a right of sexual privacy for all
consenting adults. Viewed in its clearest light Doe can be re-
garded only as a determination by the Court to close the door
quietly but firmly on any prospect for recognizing such a right in
- 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) [hereinafter cited in
text and footnotes as Doe]. Appellants John Doe and Richard Roe are homosexuals who
"regularly seek and enjoy sexual gratification in a private and consensual manner with
other adults." Their action was brought to enjoin enforcement of the Virginia sodomy
statute, see note 2 infra. The only testimony given before the three-judge court was that
of plaintiffs' witness, Frank Kameny, Ph.D., who was qualified as an expert in the field
of homosexuality. Defendants presented no evidence, and there were no factual disputes
in the case. Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 3-4. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens would have noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. 96 S.
Ct. at 1490.
' VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1975), amending VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1950). The
statute provides:
If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or car-
nally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth,
or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of
a Class 6 felony.
A Class 6 felony is punishable in Virginia by imprisonment of not less than 1 year or more
than 5 years. In the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury, the
penalty may be limited to confinement in jail of not more than 12 months and a fine of
up to $1,000. Id. § 18.2-10.
3 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut contraceptive statute held unconstitutional inva-
sion of married couple's due process right of privacy) [hereinafter cited in text and
footnotes as Griswold].
' 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts contraceptive statute held unconstitutional as
a denial of equal protection to unmarried adults) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes
as Eisenstadt].
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the foreseeable future, notwithstanding persuasive due process
and equal protection arguments to the contrary.
Basically the Supreme Court was faced with two sharply
competing options in Doe. It could write a decision that would
effectively dismantle the ancient proscriptions against sodomy, '
a decision that would join Griswold, Stanley v. Georgia,'
Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade7 in establishing an important new
benchmark in the right of privacy. Or it could exercise judicial
restraint and defer to the state's police power to legislate in areas
of public morality. Existing constitutional doctrine made either
alternative equally plausible, and either could be chosen without
straining policy, principles, or precedent. Faced with this clear
choice of alternatives, the Supreme Court elected not to break
new constitutional ground. In so doing the Court gave its official
blessing' to laws in many states which prohibit sodomy by con-
senting adults.' It also raised fresh doubts about the power of
I For a discussion of the origins and development of sodomy laws from medieval times
to the present see Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the Law,
4 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 115, 115-17 (1968). For an argument that laws regulating sexual
conduct are rooted in ancient religious beliefs, and that their perpetuation by government
unconstitutionally violates the separation of church and state see Hefner, The Legal
Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 199 (1968). See also discussion in note 79
infra.
A 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene materials in the home).
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas statute prohibiting abortion held unconstitutional as an
invasion of a woman's right of privacy in deciding whether to have an abortion during first
trimester of pregnancy). The right of privacy in abortion matters was extended to unwed
minors in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
It should be borne in mind that the Supreme Court's action in Doe was not to deny
certiorari, but rather to affirm without comment a decision on appeal from a three-judge
federal court. The difference is critical. "Reliance on denial of certiorari for any proposi-
tion impairs the vitality of the discretion we exercise in controlling cases we hear ...
When we deny certiorari, no one, not even ourselves, should think that the denial indicates
a view on the merits of the case." United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460-61 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Dismissal or affirmance of an appeal, on the other hand, "is a
decision . . . having precedential value, not a mere refusal to review that allows the lower
court's decision to stand." STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 230-31 (4th ed.
1969).
1 For a compilation of state sodomy statutes in effect as of 1971, see Note,
Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 272, 280-87 (1971). A former
Colorado statute prohibiting consensual sodomy was repealed July 1, 1973, and replaced
by two punishing only "Deviate sexual intercourse by imposition" and "Deviate sexual
intercourse by force or its equivalent." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-403 to -404 (1973),
repealing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-31 (1963). See Note, Sexual Assault Law Reform
in Colorado-An Analysis of House Bill 1042, 53 DENVER L.J. 349 (1976). For a compilation
of pre-Griswold cases holding that proscriptions against sodomy extend to heterosexual
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Griswold to carve out new areas of sexual privacy. And, by declin-
ing to hand down even a brief opinion, the Supreme Court
avoided a direct confrontation with the now overripe question of
whether statutes regulating sexual conduct between consenting
adults bear any rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.
Doe should have come as no surprise to those who have fol-
lowed state appellate and lower federal court decisions on the
constitutionality of state sodomy statutes since Griswold was de-
cided in 1965. The vast majority of courts have sustained the
constitutionality of these statutes. Only one ultimate tribunal-
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts-has held that
the state may not punish consensual sodomy between adults in
private.
This discussion begins in Part I with a consideration of those
cases in which courts were required to examine the constitution-
ality of sodomy statutes in light of Griswold and Eisenstadt;
wherein the United States Supreme Court laid the doctrinal basis
for a constitutional "right of privacy" secure against governmen-
tal intrusion, and specifically brought marital sex within the
ambit of that right. In Part II, the lower court's analysis in Doe
will be compared with three decisions which have held state so-
domy statutes constitutionally invalid as applied to consenting
adults. The conclusion discusses the meaning of Doe, including
whether Griswold may have lost whatever potency it once had as
a constitutional source for a substantive right of privacy in sexual
matters.
I. REACTIONS TO Griswold AND Eisenstadt
Prior to Griswold, state appellate courts universally held that
consent was not a defense to sodomy, whether the consent was
exercised by married or unmarried sexual partners. In State v.
Nelson,10 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
statute criminalizing sodomy expressed a legislative design to
ban such conduct, and further determined that the proscription
as well as homosexual conduct see State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 394, 301 A.2d 748, 752 (1973).
Discussions of pre-Griswold case law, along with an argument for the wholesale repeal of
state sodomy statutes, may be found in Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability
of Legislative Proscription, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 291 (1966), and Note, The Crimes Against
Nature, 16 J. PuB. L. 159 (1967).
,0 199 Minn. 86, 271 N.W. 114 (1937).
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did not stop short of the marital bed. Likewise, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court declared that compulsion was not an element
of sodomy, and that consent was no bar to the prosecution of
either married or unmarried persons."
Griswold and Eisenstadt radically altered the course of so-
domy litigation by providing an entirely new line of constitutional
attack. Beginning with Griswold, state and lower federal court
decisions have fallen into three major categories: First, cases
holding that married couples are exempted from sodomy statutes
on the ground that Griswold constitutionally screens consensual
marital sex from state scrutiny; second, cases decided since
Eisenstadt rejecting the argument that unmarried adults are ex-
empted from sodomy statutes on the authority of Griswold and
Eisenstadt; and third, cases decided since Eisenstadt holding
that state sodomy statutes are unconstitutional as applied to all
consenting adults. As will be seen, Eisenstadt was the critical
factor in stemming the seemingly inexorable tide of decisions
holding unmarried persons criminally liable for consensual so-
domy.
A. From Griswold to Eisenstadt
Cotner v. Henry" was the first case to make specific use of
Griswold in decriminalizing consensual sodomy between married
persons. The defendant had filed a habeas corpus petition after
being sentenced to 2-14 years for committing "the abominable
and detestable crime against nature" with his wife. His convic-
tion was set aside on the ground that a guilty plea had been
entered without knowledge of Griswold and the strong constitu-
tional arguments that case offered him. The court noted that the
prosecutrix was the defendant's wife, and that she had made no
claim of compulsion. Construing Griswold to mean that "private,
consensual, marital relations are protected from regulation by the
state through the use of criminal penalty,"' 3 the court held that
consensual sex between married persons could not be punished
absent a "clear showing that the state had an interest in prevent-
ing such relations, which outweighed the constitutional right to
" State v. Jemigan, 255 N.C. 732, 122 S.E.2d 711 (1961).
12 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) [hereinafter cited in text
and footnotes as Cotner].
11 394 F.2d at 875.
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marital privacy."'" Cotner became a foundation case, on which
later decisions would build, standing for the proposition that con-
sensual marital sex was within the ambit of Griswold and thus
immune to criminal sanctions. 5
Two years after the Supreme Court had denied certiorari in
Cotner, a three-judge federal court examined the constitution-
ality of the Texas sodomy statute in Buchanan v. Batchelor."5 The
original action was brought by a homosexual, but a married cou-
ple intervened on the ground the statute did not exempt private
acts of married persons. The statute was declared facially void for
unconstitutional overbreadth, the court reasoning that since
Griswold had brought marital relationships within the scope of
privacy, the Texas statute swept too broadly in punishing marital
conduct along with homosexual sodomy. No legitimate state pur-
pose in criminalizing homosexual sodomy, the court said, could
justify intrusion into the private conduct of married persons.
Buchanan was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court, and
Texas courts have consistently declined to adopt the federal dis-
trict court's reasoning. 7
" Id.
' Cotner was cited with approval the following year in Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp.
581 (W.D. Va. 1969). In Towler a man convicted of forcible sodomy on his wife raised a
constitutional challenge to the Virginia sodomy statute. The statute was upheld, but in
dictum the court noted that had the element of force been absent it would have been
"guided" by Cotner. Id. at 582. Cotner was then cited for the principle that consensual
sodomy by a married coupe is no crime without a clear showing that the state's interest
outweighed the right of marital privacy established in Griswold. Id.
"1 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S.
989 (1971) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Buchanan]. For a discussion of the
lower court's decision see Note, Sodomy Statutes: The Question of Constitutionality, 50
NEB. L. REV. 567 (1971), and Comment, Texas Statute Prohibiting Sodomy Is
Unconstitutionally Overbroad in Proscribing Private, Consensual Conduct of Unmarried
Couples, 49 TEX. L. REV. 400 (1971).
'1 See Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402
U.S. 902 (1971), wherein the state court specifically repudiated Buchanan and rejected
any claims that the Texas sodomy statute was constitutionally infirm. The court then
went on to hold that consensual marital sex was not covered by the statute. It reached
this conclusion not on the basis of prior case law, but on the unique theory that prosecu-
tion of married persons for sodomy was a practical impossibility. A private sexual act will
not have witnesses, the court said, and if the conduct is consensual the parties are equally
guilty, which would require outside corroboration of the act; in any event, where the
element of force was lacking neither husband nor wife would be competent to testify
against the other.
As for the claim of unconstitutional overbreadth, the state court refused to strike
down the Texas statute on the basis that it covered a class of persons-i.e., married
1976
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B. The Griswold-Eisenstadt Principle Rejected
Prior to Eisenstadt, actions brought by unmarried persons to
challenge the constitutionality of state sodomy statutes were uni-
formly unsuccessful."8 The infirmity underlying these persistent
defeats was that the assault had to be mounted almost exclu-
sively on the strength of Griswold, which was conceptually too
inelastic for the job it was being asked to do. Consequently the
parties' tireless attacks were met with the courts' equally tireless
reiteration that Griswold was written not to secure the rights of
American men and women at large, but only those sacrosanct
marital amenities such as the home, the family, and the healthy
procreational activities of the connubial bed. Griswold's right to
privacy might ultimately embrace a broad range of fundamental
human interests, such as a woman's right to abortion, 9 but in
purely sexual matters it could not be extended without the help
of some conceptual tool that would gather married and unmarried
persons under the same constitutional umbrella, thereby linking
adults-who in fact are not prosecuted under the statute. To allow such a result, the court
said, would be inconsistent with Griswold and the reverence which Justice Douglas paid
to the marital relationship in that case. It went on to declare that the Texas statute
nevertheless remained fully applicable against unmarried consenting adults. Accord,
Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972).
Since Pruett v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has thrice upheld the
state sodomy statute against attacks for unconstitutional overbreadth and violation of
constitutional rights. Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816 (1974); Turner v. State, 497 S.W.2d
593 (1973); Everette v. State, 465 S.W.2d 162 (1971).
" Courts in California, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, and Texas rejected the right-of-privacy argument, holding that regulation of
sodomy was a permissible state objective. Most cases also held that such statutes invaded
no constitutionally protected areas. See People v. Brown, 6 Cal. App. 3d 619, 86 Cal. Rptr.
149 (1970); People v. Blagg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 598, 73 Cal. Rptr. 93, aff'd, 10 Cal. App. 3d
1035, 89 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1968); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70
(1967) (following a pre-Griswold holding in People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal. App. 2d 676, 2
Cal. Rptr. 640 (1960); Miller v. State, 256 Ind. 296, 268 N.E.2d 299 (1971); Dixon v. State,
256 Ind. 266, 268 N.E.2d 84 (1971); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966);
Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M. App. 428, 483 P.2d 309 (1971); Raphael v. Hogan, 305
F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Moore v. State, 501 P.2d 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973); Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971);
Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (challenge to Texas sodomy statute
dismissed for lack of justiciability); Everette v. State, 465 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S.
902 (1971).
'" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
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both classes to the right of privacy guaranteed in Griswold. That
tool was to be fashioned in Eisenstadt, which meshed with
Griswold to provide an argument for a substantive right of sexual
privacy unrelated to marriage. Even then the argument was to be
rejected by a great majority of courts.
The analytical flaws in the new Griswold-Eisenstadt princi-
ple were first revealed in Lair v. State,20 which proved a signifi-
cant bellwether of how this two-pronged argument would fare in
the courts. Lair fell at a critical point in the history of sodomy
litigation, coming well after Griswold had ripened to judicial ac-
ceptance, but only one year after the Supreme Court held in
Eisenstadt that the married-unmarried classification was an un-
constitutional basis for criminalizing the distribution of contra-
ceptives. Thus the defendant in Lair found the court willing to
grant his claim that, on the strength of Griswold and Cotner,
consensual marital conduct was exempt under the New Jersey
sodomy statute; but the court summarily rejected his then novel
argument that Eisenstadt clothed unmarried adults in all the
rights of privacy accorded married persons in Griswold. Echoing
similar language in Pruett v. State,21 Hughes v. State2 and other
cases where a critical distinction was drawn between married and
unmarried persons, the court said:
The opinion of Justice Douglas in Griswold eulogizes the married
state, stresses the intimacies of married life and concludes that pri-
vacy is so important to a fulfillment of the marriage relationship as
to justify recognition as a right of constitutional dimension. It is a
rather obvious non sequitur that as a matter of equal protection
some similar or equal right to privacy must be found to exist in order
to protect the sexual conduct of the unmarried. . . . [Eisenstadt]
touches in no way upon the right of marital privacy with which
Griswold is concerned. .... .
Further distinguishing the two cases, the court pointed out that
while the results reached in Griswold and Eisenstadt were analo-
gous, their doctrinal bases were distinctly different: Eisenstadt
declared the Massachusetts contraceptive statute a violation of
equal protection, while in Griswold the Connecticut contracep-
62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Lair].
463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971). See
note 17 supra.
14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972).
62 N.J. at 396-97, 301 A.2d at 753.
1976
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tive statute was deemed inconsistent with a due process right of
privacy. Having disposed of the argument that Eisenstadt is a
linear extension of Griswold, the court held that consensual so-
domy by unmarried persons was not entitled to constitutional
protection under either decision. 4
As the court demonstrated in Lair, the rationale of
Eisenstadt did not ineluctably bring unmarried persons within
the scope of a due process right of privacy. Nor were many courts
moved by Eisenstadt's equal protection argument when they were
asked to apply it to sodomy, a species of sexual conduct that was
void of the redeeming procreational considerations and "natural
sex" that were at stake in the abortion and contraceptive cases."
Unpersuaded even in the wake of Eisenstadt, courts followed the
lead of Lair and turned back fresh or renewed challenges to so-
domy statutes in several states.
24 Lair also considered a challenge to the New Jersey sodomy statute on the ground
it was unconstitutionally vague in failing to set out with sufficient clarity the conduct
proscribed. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 (1952) equated "sodomy" with "the infamous
crime against nature, committed with man or beast," but offered no further definition.
The court held that "crime against nature" had a definite meaning in common law, that
this meaning was well known to the general population, and that failure to describe
sodomy in precise terms "has always been attributed to legislative desire to avoid the
indelicacy of explicit description." 62 N.J. at 394, 301 A.2d at 752.
The leading case in the area of sodomy statutes challenged for unconstitutional
vagueness is Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, rev'g per curiam 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1973), holding a Florida statute not unconstitutional for vagueness in its proscription
against "the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with
beast." Accord, Locke v. Rose, 423 U.S. 48, rev'g per curiam 514 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1975);
Thompson v. Turner, 275 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.C. 1967); State v. Moles, 17 N.C. App. 664,
195 S.E.2d 352 (1973); Moore v. State, 501 P.2d 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 987 (1973). Contra, Jellum v. Cupp, 475 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1973) (Oregon statute
proscribing "unnatural conduct contrary to the course of nature" unconstitutionally
vague); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969) ("crime against nature" held unconsti-
tutionally vague, but "sodomy" held constitutionally permissible); Franklin v. State, 257
So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971) ("abominable and detestable crime against nature"). For a general
discussion of the question see Note, Sodomy Statutes: The Question of Constitutionality,
50 NEB. L. REV. 567, 568 (1971). While some sodomy statutes have been set aside for
unconstitutional vagueness, these holdings cannot be regarded as substantive victories
since state legislatures have been able to cure the constitutional infirmity merely by
explicitly describing the crime, as Virginia has done. See note 2 supra.
25 See discussion in note 88 infra.
" See State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev 'd sub nom. State
v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d
368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d
114, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973); People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App. 3d 385, 112
Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974); People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207, 105 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1973) (an
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C. The Griswold-Eisenstadt Principle Sustained
Despite its ultimate failure to penetrate the constitutional
armor which judicial interpretations of Griswold have erected
against challenges brought by unmarried persons, Eisenstadt has
been the critical factor in those few decisions which have declared
sodomy statutes invalid as against consenting adults. The value
of Eisenstadt lies in supplying a nexus arguably linking the inter-
ests of unmarried persons to the right of sexual privacy which
Cotner7 and Buchanan"5 found for the marital relationship in
Griswold. The absence of this nexus accounts for the fact that
prior to Eisenstadt no state or federal court extrapolated from
Griswold a generic right of sexual privacy for consenting adults.
Wrapped in Justice Douglas' "eulogy" of marriage, and further
confined by the specific restrictions laid down by other Justices
in concurring opinions,2' Griswold stoutly refused to yield until
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Eisenstadt, drew a
tenuous connection by means of his oft-quoted reference to an
"individual" right of privacy:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.3
Using Eisenstadt to breach Griswold's hitherto impenetrable
wall, three state appellate courts have held that a right of sexual
privacy exists to shield the sexual conduct of unmarried consent-
ing adults from state scrutiny. The Supreme Judicial Court of
unreported case from California, People v. Schwarz, Super. Ct. No. A-282165 (1973),
holding the California sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied to consenting adults,
was disapproved in People v. Drolet, supra; see 58 A.L.R.3d 640 n.7); State v. Enslin, 25
N.C. App. 662, 214 S.E.2d 318, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 245, 217 S.E.2d 669 (1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1492 (1976) (Enslin was convicted of oral sodomy with a young man
who, acting as a police undercover agent, invited and permitted the petitioner to perform
the act in the petitioner's bedroom); State v. Crouse, 22 N.C. App. 47, 205 S.E.2d 361
(1974); State v. Moles, 17 N.C. App. 664, 195 S.E.2d 352 (1973); Canfield v. State, 506
P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973); Cook v. State, 506
S.W.2d 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Turner v. State, 497 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
v 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
2 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S.
989 (1971).
E.g., 381 U.S. 479, 495-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
405 U.S. at 453.
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Massachusetts was first in Commonwealth v. Balthazar.' Noting
the Supreme Court's "articulation of the constitutional right to
be free from governmental regulation of certain sex-related activi-
ties," the court concluded that the Massachusetts sodomy statute
"must be construed to be inapplicable to private, consensual con-
duct of adults."32 The New Mexico Court of Appeals was next in
State v. Elliott,33 declaring the state sodomy statute facially void
as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Arizona Court of Appeals followed suit in State
v. Callaway,34 finding the state statute violative of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Of
these three decisions, only Balthazar can be relied upon as au-
thority. The court of appeals' holding in Callaway was set aside
by the Arizona Supreme Court shortly before Doe was affirmed,
35
and Elliott has been reversed by the New Mexico Supreme
Court.36
31 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974).
32 Id. at 481.
88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. App. 1975), rev'd, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976).
31 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, rev'd sub nom. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,
547 P.2d 6 (1976).
3 The Arizona Supreme Court held that "sexual activity between two consenting
adults in private is not a matter of concern for the State except insofar as the legislature
has acted to properly regulate the moral welfare of its people, and has specifically prohib-
ited sodomy and other specified lewd and lascivious acts." 547 P.2d at 10. The court
further stated that "[t]he right of privacy is not unqualified and absolute and must be
considered in the light of important state interests," and that among those interests was
the state's concern "for the moral welfare of its people." Id. Justice Gordon said in dissent
that he would affirm Callaway and its companion case, State v. Bateman, "as they both
appear to be correct interpretations of the law as laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in this area." Id. at 11.
11 The opinion reversing Elliott was based primarily on the decision in Doe. The court
was careful, however, to point out that the parties in Elliott were not husband and wife,
and so avoided confronting the Griswold issue. 551 P.2d at 1353. In other case law develop-
ment, two lower state courts have declared the New York sodomy statute unconstitu-
tional, both holding on equal protection grounds. People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363
N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1975); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355
N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City Ct. 1974). The Nevada Supreme Court has expressed grave
doubts about the constitutionality of its sodomy statute as applied to consenting adults.
Allan v. State, 541 P.2d 656 (Nev. 1975). A federal district judge in Pennsylvania has
strongly suggested that he may void that state's sodomy statute at the first opportunity.
United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). And a federal district judge in Virginia has declared that
were a party with proper standing to bring the issue before him he would be compelled to
strike down the Virginia statute as an unconstitutional infringement on the right of pri-
vacy of unmarried adults. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E. D. Va. 1973) (Merhige,
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Despite the tenuous beachheads established by these post-
Eisenstadt cases, the overwhelming number of courts have agreed
with Lair that the mantle of constitutional protection does not
extend to the sexual conduct of unmarried persons. Of the 14 pre-
Eisenstadt decisions noted here, 7 not one stands as authority for
exempting unmarried persons from state sodomy laws. Of the 19
post-Eisenstadt decisions, 8 all but six have affirmatively rejected
arguments that these statutes are unconstitutional;39 and in only
one instance - Commonwealth v. Balthazar4° - has a substan-
tive challenge been sustained by a court with the ultimate au-
thority to do so.' It was against this background that John Doe
and Richard Roe, two Virginia homosexuals, brought their action
for a declaratory judgment striking down the Virginia sodomy
statute in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
II. ANALYSIS OF Doe
The choice presented to the Supreme Court in Doe could not
have been more sharply defined. The appellants had moved for a
declaratory judgment striking down the Virginia sodomy statute
on the grounds it was a denial of equal protection and an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of their rights of privacy, freedom of asso-
ciation, and freedom of expression. Apart from the fact the appel-
lants were homosexuals, the issue was uncluttered by any contex-
tual problems. The great bulk of prior case law sustained the
validity of statutes like Virginia's, but a handful of carefully rea-
soned cases holding to the contrary was also available for the
Court's consideration.
J.), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 62 through 70 infra.
.Judge Merhige was a member of the three-judge court convened to hear Doe, and wrote a
dissenting opinion in that case. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
:1 See authorities cited note 18 supra.
' See authorities cited notes 26, 31, 33, and 36 supra.
Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.
1976); United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478
(Mass. 1974); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. App. 1975), rev'd, 551
P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976); People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct.
Suffolk County 1975); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1974).
40 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974).
" For a discussion of sodomy statutes overturned on grounds of unconstitutional
vagueness, see note 24 supra.
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In electing to affirm the lower court's decision without com-
ment, the Supreme Court raised grave doubts about the scope of
a constitutional right of privacy, and-perhaps deliberately-left
doctrinal matters in this area in a state of profound uncertainty.
The purpose here is to reduce the uncertainty created by the
Court's silence, if such is possible, and to work toward some un-
derstanding of Doe as a matter of constitutional law. To do this
it is necessary to frame the constitutional doctrines within which
the Court made its decision. As will be seen, the Court was in the
convenient position of being able to draw both on its own deci-
sions and those of other courts to support polar opposite conclu-
sions. Griswold and its progeny cut like a two-edged sword across
the sodomy issue. The division among lower courts following
Eisenstadt provided an ample supply of analytical models which
would have enabled the Court to reach a principled decision in
either direction.
One model available for the Court's adoption was the opinion
of the three-judge court in Doe.42 A second, composite model was
provided by one federal and two state appellate court decisions
which used Griswold as a springboard for extending a constitu-
tionally protected right of sexual privacy to all consenting
adults. 3 When the Supreme Court's affirmance in Doe is mea-
sured against the doctrinal formulations reached in these three
cases, the contrast provides some rough conclusions as to the
long-term significance of Doe.
When the New Mexico Court of Appeals handed down State
v. Elliott" in July 1975, it became the nation's first state appel-
late court to hold a sodomy statute unconstitutional on the au-
thority of Griswold and Eisenstadt." Massachusetts had ex-
2 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976).
Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.
1976); State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, rev'd sub nom. State v.
Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207
(N.M. App. 1975), rev'd, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976). The value of Elliott and Callaway
as models of analysis is greatly diminished by the fact that each decision has been reversed
by its respective supreme court. Despite their weakness as authority, the appeals courts'
opinions in these two cases are nevertheless worthy analyses of the constitutionality of
sodomy statutes.
" 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. App. 1975), rev'd 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976)
[hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Elliott].
,1 See, however, discussion in note 24 supra regarding statutes overturned for uncon-
stitutional vagueness.
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empted consenting adults from its sodomy statute 8 months ear-
lier, citing in a footnote a number of federal court decisions on
the right of privacy;4" but Elliott was the first decision to articu-
late a chain of reasoning which led systematically from Griswold
to a holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
consenting adults. Elliott is not an impeccably constructed deci-
sion, but it does map out one doctrinal scheme-in this case, an
equal protection argument-which a court could follow to hold a
sodomy statute in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The court in Elliott began its analysis by citing Griswold for
the proposition that
[tioday .. .our law recognizes a constitutionally-protected right
to marital privacy. This right lies within the zone of privacy created
by constitutional guarantees in the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments . . . . It is a right that is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" ....Roe v. Wade. 7
Having concluded that sexual privacy is a fundamental right of
married persons, the court then sought to extend that right to
unmarried persons. This in turn raised a conceptual problem
which could be solved only by bringing Eisenstadt within the
scope of the analysis. The difficulty faced by the court was that
Griswold rests on due process, while Eisenstadt was based on
equal protection. Some doctrinal basis-a connection more sub-
stantial than the mere fact that both cases overturned contracep-
tive statutes-had to be found to link the two decisions. The
nexus lay in Eisenstadt's crucial language asserting that "[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion ....
With unmarried persons thus brought within the reach of
Griswold, the final step was to determine whether the statute
" Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 481-82 n.2 (Mass. 1974). The cases
cited are: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Cotner v.
Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363
F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973); aff'd; 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976); Buchanan v. Batchelor,
308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub non. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989
(1971).
88 N.M. at 193, 539 P.2d at 213.
4 405 U.S. at 453. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
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discriminated invidiously against this class of persons. The court
concluded:
To allow the Legislature to regulate sexual practices between
unmarried consenting adults, but not between married persons,
would be to deny equal protection of the laws to the former, contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment. Eisenstadt v. Baird."'
The appeals court buttressed its position by citing Ravin v.
State,0 a 1975 decision by the Alaska Supreme Court declaring
that a statute prohibiting the possession and use of marijuana in
the home unconstitutionally violated individual rights of privacy
under the United States and Alaskan Constitutions. Borrowing
from Ravin the general proposition that a state's police power is
limited to matters where individual conduct substantially affects
the public at large, the court declared that the New Mexico stat-
ute invades constitutionally protected rights and "cannot be vali-
dated simply by a showing that it accomplishes a purpose that is
within the police power of the State."'"
The result reached in Elliott was duplicated 4 months later
in State v. Callaway,52 when the Arizona Court of Appeals held
that state's sodomy statute unconstitutional on substantive due
process grounds. Citing Griswold as the constitutional wellspring
for a right of sexual privacy, the court criticized four pre-
Eisenstadt decisions5 3 for having "inaccurately" interpreted
Griswold as being limited strictly to "a 'eulogy' of the marital
relationship."" While other courts had assumed from Griswold
," 88 N.M. at 193, 539 P.2d at 213.
537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975).
11 88 N.M. at 194, 539 P.2d at 214. The New Mexico court did not pause to consider
whether the state might have been able to justify the invidious discrimination by demon-
strating a compelling state interest in regulating sexual conduct. In fact the state never
had an opportunity to argue the constitutionality of the sodomy statute. The defendant
had been acquitted below, and the state had taken an appeal on the factual issue of
consent. No constitutional issues were raised before the trial or appellate courts. In its
apparent eagerness to void the New Mexico statute, however, the court of appeals found
that the case "nonetheless provides a proper forum for this Court to decide whether the
sodomy statute invades the constitutional rights of consenting adults." Id. at 210.
S2 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev 'd sub nom. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz.
107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Callaway].
3 Dixon v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 268 N.E.2d 84 (1971); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App.
497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M.
App. 428, 483 P.2d 309 (1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970),
appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
- 542 P.2d at 1150.
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that "the right of privacy inhered in the marriage relationship
alone," the Arizona court reasoned that Eisenstadt had clearly
"extended the right of privacy under Griswold far beyond the
narrow view"55 which those courts had erroneously taken. Citing
Justice Brennan's oft-quoted reference to "the individual" in
Eisenstadt," the court concluded that "[tihis language makes it
clear that the right of privacy is a right of all persons, whether
married or not."57 In view of the right of privacy which Griswold
and Eisenstadt jointly extend,
no sound argument can be made that the right of privacy in sexual
conduct between consenting adults is "fundamental" only when the
consenting adults are married to each other. The right of privacy is
deemed fundamental because it is basic to the concept of the indi-
vidual in our American culture and because it is a necessary prere-
quisite to the effective enjoyment of all our other fundamental
rights. As Eisenstadt and its progeny have recognized, these reasons
are wholly unrelated to the existence vel non of a marriage relation-
ship. We hold accordingly that the right of sexual privacy between
consenting adults is fundamental.-
At this juncture, having established sexual privacy as a con-
stitutionally guaranteed right of all consenting adults, the court
utilized language from Roe v. Wade to set up a strict scrutiny test
against which to measure the state's interest in regulating sexual
conduct:
"Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has
held that regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by
a 'compelling state interest'...
The Arizona court states that it has
"looked in vain" for a compelling state interest . . . .We have
found none and can conceive of none. . . .We therefore hold that
the subject statutes are void as violative of the constitutional right
of privacy."0
In conclusion the court notes that Elliott "provides an alternative
ground for our decision,""' and that it also could have struck down
the sodomy proscription as a violation of equal protection.
55 Id.
11 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
17 542 P.2d at 1151.
58 Id.
542 P.2d at 1151, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
542 P.2d at 1151 (citation omitted).
61 Id.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Elliott and Callaway were strongly influenced by a 1973 opin-
ion handed down by Judge Robert R. Merhige of the Eastern
District of Virginia. In Lovisi v. Slayton,"2 Judge Merhige con-
cluded that the Virginia sodomy statute was unconstitutional as
applied to consenting adults acting in private, and declared that
he would so rule should the issue ever come before him in a
justiciable posture.63 That opportunity arrived two years later
with Doe, where Merhige vigorously dissented from the majority
opinion of the three-judge court.64 Lovisi of course had no effect
on the Virginia statute, and is now valuable chiefly as the most
sophisticated judicial expression to date of the Griswold-
Eisenstadt line of attack on state sodomy laws.
Lovisi follows a pure due process line of reasoning. This is
clear from the court's lengthy ruminations on the origins of sub-
stantive due process, in which it rejected the theory that newly
created rights must derive from a specific constitutional provi-
sion, and adopted instead
the candid approach of Roe v. Wade . . .and of Mr. Justice Har-
lan's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut. . . that the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment provides substantive pro-
tection for fundamental values "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." 5
Having carefully set out the constitutional principle by which it
would analyze the question, the court proceeded to lay the foun-
dation for holding that all consenting adults enjoy a substantive
right of sexual privacy under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
Griswold, Judge Merhige reasoned, unequivocally extended
the right of privacy to sexual relations between husband and wife.
While Merhige conceded that Griswold's authority may be lim-
ited to the marital bedroom, he further argued that Eisenstadt
" 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter
cited in text and footnotes as Lovisij.
11 Id. at 625. In Lovisi a married couple sought relief through habeas corpus from their
convictions under the Virginia sodomy statute, a class 6 felony. See note 2 supra. The
court stated that absolute privacy was a prerequisite to asserting any right to consensual
sodomy. The defendants waived their right of privacy, the court held, by permitting third
persons to witness the sodomy, either in person or by photographs. Therefore the defen-
dants had no standing to challenge the statute.
" 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting).
363 F. Supp. at 624.
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can only be construed as "extending the rationale of Griswold""6
to unmarried persons. Moreover, Eisenstadt "casts doubt upon
the viability of the marital-nonmarital distinction" because in
Eisenstadt the Supreme Court "declined to restrict the right of
privacy in sexual matters to married couples.""7 The court quoted
Justice Brennan's famous language in Eisenstadt"5 as proof of this
proposition, and of what it concluded to be the indisputable fact
that Eisenstadt is in a direct line of descent from Griswold.
Summing up the result of its substantive due process reason-
ing, the court concluded that
the rationale expressed in Eisenstadt extends to protect the manner
of sexual relations between unmarried persons. It is not marriage
vows which make intimate and highly personal the sexual behavior
of human beings. It is, instead, the nature of sexuality itself or
something intensely private to the individual that calls forth consti-
tutional protection. While the condition of marriage would doubt-
less make more difficult an attempt by government to justify an
intrusion upon sexual behavior, this condition is not a prerequisite
to the operation of the right of privacy. Accordingly, the statute also
poses a threat to the right of privacy possessed by consenting
adults."
Having found that a fundamental right was at stake, and that the
statute threatened an invasion of that right, the court declared
that the statute could be sustained only if the state's interest
outweighed that of the individual. The ultimate issue was framed
as "whether a compelling state interest underlies and justifies"70
the Virginia sodomy statute.
11 Id. at 625.
67 Id.
" See text accompanying note 30 supra. This passage from Eisenstadt is unfailingly
set forth in any decision which attempts to draw a connection between the rights of
privacy of married and unmarried people. The reasons for its popularity are quite appar-
ent: (1) It contains the only reference to Griswold in the entire majority opinion; and (2)
it is the only point in Eisenstadt where the decision shifts briefly from an equal protection
to a due process basis. Apart from the fact that Griswold and Eisenstadt both struck down
contraceptive statutes, they are essentially two very different expressions of constitutional
law. Some courts have seized upon the doctrinal difference as a basis for not extending a
right of sexual privacy to unmarried persons. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
11 363 F. Supp. at 625.
10 Id. Unfortunately the court never answered its own question. Instead, having sharp-
ened the constitutional issue to a fine point, the court declared that the facts of the instant
case relieved it of any duty to make the determination of constitutionality. By way of
explanation, the court reiterated its earlier conclusion that the defendants lacked standing
to challenge the statute. See note 63 supra.
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Elliott, Callaway, Lovisi, and a handfull of other decisions7'
provided the Supreme Court with analytical models that, despite
their imperfections, illustrated a line of principled reasoning
which led plausibly from Griswold to a conclusion that all forms
of private sexual conduct by consenting adults enjoyed constitu-
tional protection. Equal protection and substantive due process
both appeared to be useful approaches by which to analyze the
constitutional issue.72 Overpowering these few decisions, however,
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Lovisi, coupled with the three-judge court's opinion
in Doe and the Supreme Court's affirmance of that decision, has left the constitutionality
of the Virginia sodomy statute in a state of no little confusion. In Doe, the three-judge
court specifically declared that the Virginia statute was constitutional "on its face and in
the circumstances here": That is, the statute was constitutional as applied to "any per-
son," see note 2 supra, whether that person be homosexual or heterosexual, married or
unmarried, and that it was constitutional as applied specifically to homosexual conduct.
403 F. Supp. at 1200. That the court was condemning all sodomy would appear from the
fact that it made no attempt either to exempt married couples or to narrow the statute's
application to homosexuals. Moreover, the court specifically referred to the facts in Lovisi
as "just such a sexual orgy as the statute was evidently intended to punish." 403 F. Supp.
at 1202. Lovisi had involved heterosexual conduct and had directly raised the issue of
marital privacy.
In sustaining the Lovisis' conviction, however, the Fourth Circuit adopted the trial
judge's argument that the Lovisis had "waived" their right of marital privacy by permit-
ting a third person to witness the act. Chief Judge Haynsworth, writing for the majority,
stated that married persons "possess the freedom to follow their own inclinations in
privacy, but once they accept onlookers" the couple may not exclude a state as a "consti-
tutionally forbidden intruder." 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court's
alfirmance in Doe, Haynsworth added, "reinforces our conclusion that the oral sexual
activity of the Lovisis in the presence of. . . was not within the area of the constitution's
protection." Id. at 352. In adopting Judge Merhige's reasoning insofar as it applied to the
Lovisis, a married couple, the court impliedly held that a right of sexual privacy does
inhere in the marital relationship, and that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional as
applied to consenting married adults. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit rejected
Judge Merhige's dictum that a fundamental right of sexual privacy exists for all consent-
ing adults, and that the right applies indiscriminately unless it is waived by permitting
others to view the act.
The three-judge court's holding in Doe and the Fourth Circuit's holding in Lovisi
cannot be adequately reconciled, despite Haynsworth's assertion that Doe was limited to
"homosexual acts." It would appear, however, that the Fourth Circuit has concluded the
Virginia sodomy statute is unconstitutional as applied to consenting married adults acting
in private, and will so hold if the issue is ever raised properly before the court.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363
N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1975); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355
N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City Ct. 1974).
11 For further discussion of the Griswold-Eisenstadt line of reasoning see Comment,
Oral Copulation: A Constitutional Curtain Must Be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523
(1974).
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was the great weight of cases which had declined to recognize
Eisenstadt as a conduit linking unmarried persons to a right of
privacy in sexual matters. Lair v. State73 was the strongest exam-
ple of judicial refusal to extend Griswold. The analysis which
demanded the Court's primary attention, of course, was the lower
court's opinion in Doe holding that the Virginia sodomy statute
was constitutional on its face and as applied to private, consen-
sual homosexual acts.
74
The district court set out five basic reasons for sustaining the
constitutionality of the Virginia statute in Doe: First, Griswold
and other precedents cited by the plaintiffs rest exclusively on the
precept that the Constitution condemns legislation which "tres-
passes upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the
sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of family life; '75 homo-
sexuality, however, does not lie within the scope of the marital
interest in privacy; second, the court may not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the legislature in matters concerning "the promo-
tion of morality and decency; 76 third, assuming that the state
has the burden of proving that it has a "legitimate interest in the
subject of the statute or that the statute is rationally supportable,
Virginia has completely fulfilled that obligation;"" fourth, the
state is not required to show that homosexuality actually encour-
ages delinquency, and "[i]t is enough for upholding the legisla-
tion to establish that the conduct is likely to end in a contribution
73 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
11 While homosexuals are often the real target of state sodomy laws, in no case has a
distinction between homosexual and heterosexual conduct loomed as the determinative
factor in a court's decision. Nor is there any reported decision voiding a sodomy statute
on the basis of selective enforcement against homosexuals. The majority opinion of the
three-judge court in Doe consistently refers to the state's interest in punishing homosex-
uality, but the court deftly avoids making the homosexual-heterosexual distinction the
pivotal point of analysis. See discussion in note 70 supra.
For a discussion of other legal problems encountered by homosexuals see Willick,
Social Class As a Factor Affecting Judicial Disposition: Defendants Charged with Crimi-
nal Homosexual Acts, 13 CRIMINOLOGY 57 (1975); Note, Security Clearances for
Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403 (1973); Comment, Government Employment and the
Homosexual, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (1970).
" 403 F. Supp. at 1200. The plaintiffs had relied heavily on Eisenstadt and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in their arguments to the court. See Opening Brief for Plain-
tiffs at 4, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. Eisenstadt and Roe, however, go unmen-
tioned in the court's opinion.
11 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
77 Id.
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to moral delinquency;"7 and fifth, Virginia's sodomy statute is
not an "upstart notion;" it can be traced to the Virginia Code of
1792, and has "ancestry going back to the Judaic and Christian
law."7"
As an example of constitutional analysis the lower court's
opinion in Doe cannot command great respect. It is riddled by
three major weaknesses. First, its selection of the "rational basis"
test to measure the constitutionality of the Virginia statute is
highly debatable, if not clearly untenable. It has been well estab-
lished since the principle was first enunciated in United States
v. Carolene Products Co.sa that statutory schemes which impinge
on individual interests and liberties will be subject to a stricter
standard of review than the "rational basis" test traditionally
applied to economic legislation. The power to regulate does not
mandate any legislation merely because it is aimed toward a
constitutionally permissible goal; thus while regulation of sexual
conduct arguably lies within the scope of a state's police power
that fact alone does not legitimate a court's use of the "rational
basis" test where something more than an economic right is at
stake-in this instance, an adult's desire to perform a victimless
act in private. That desire may or may not amount to a "funda-
mental" human right. In any event the deprivation cannot be
sustained by anything less than a colorable showing on the
state's part that it has a legitimate interest in denying that desire.
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal lib-
'A Id.
7' Id. In support of the ancient religious origins of sodomy laws, the court quoted
Leviticus 18:22: "'Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is
abomination.'" Again, 20:13: "'If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their
blood shall be upon them.' "Id. at 1202 n.2. The plaintiffs argued to the three-judge court
that the Virginia sodomy statute violated the establishment clause of the first amendment
in that it "serves no other purpose than to enforce the legacy of the Judeo-Christian ethic
viewing sodomy as a sin." Opening Brief for Plaintiffs at 12-13. The court ignored this
claim.
For two decisions where courts rejected arguments that proscriptions against sodomy
were specifically rooted in ancient Judaic and Christian laws, and that in perpetuating
this religious ethic sodomy statutes violated the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, see Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991
(1973), and People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App. 3d 385, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974).
- 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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erty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling."'" By its failure to invoke a higher
standard of review the court effectively ignores the constitutional
question, demonstrating anew the potential tyranny of the "ra-
tional basis" test as a means by which a court can sustain legis-
lation without undergoing the rigors of careful analysis.
The second major infirmity in the court's treatment of Doe
is its failure to deal with or even mention Eisenstadt and Roe v.
Wade,"2 decisions of unquestioned importance in the area of
constitutional privacy. The court offers not the slightest explana-
tion for ignoring these vital precedents.
Finally, the opinion's chief weakness lies in its extraordinar-
ily heavy reliance on dicta in Griswold and Poe v. Ullman3 as
definitive statements of constitutional principles. The analysis of
Griswold as a potential wellspring of fundamental rights is lim-
ited to a quotation of Justice Douglas' so-called "eulogy of mar-
riage. "84 Justice Harlan's lengthy dissent in Poe is quoted exhaus-
tively for the proposition that homosexual conduct is not consti-
tutionally protected. 5 These dicta are virtually the flesh and
blood of the court's decision, leaving one to search in vain for
some plausible analysis that would justify the result.
In sum, the court's cursory and superficial treatment of the
important constitutional question underlying Doe, coupled with
its wrongful application of the "rational basis" test and inexplic-
able indifference to Eisenstadt and Roe, combined to produce a
poorly reasoned and doctrinally inscrutable opinion. By contrast
the court in Lair v. State"6 squarely confronted the issues, exam-
ined the relevant precedents, and forthrightly set out its conclu-
" Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
.2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (challenge to constitutionality
of Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives dismissed for lack of justicia-
bility).
" "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights .... Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred." 381 U.S. at 486. The three-judge court also refers to, but does not quote,
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold where he notes that a state may have an
interest in "the discouraging of extra-marital relations" and the regulation of "sexual
promiscuity or misconduct." 381 U.S. at 498, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
- 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
- 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
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sions of law. The opinion from the Eastern District of Virginia
merely increased what are already grave difficulties in evaluating
this area of constitutional tension.
CONCLUSION
In affirming Doe, the Supreme Court effectively rejected the
analytical models provided by Elliott, Lovisi, and Callaway, put-
ting its imprimatur instead on a lower court opinion that cited
more dicta than doctrine and failed even to confront the constitu-
tional issues involved. Doe now stands-at least insofar as its
result is concerned-as an approved gloss of the constitutional
question raised by state statutory proscriptions against private
sexual conduct of unmarried adults."7 And however shocking the
Court's decision may have been to the legal community, and to
Americans who had already taken a right of sexual privacy for
granted, it is utterly consistent with the great weight of decisions
by state and lower federal courts which have considered the same
issue.
What is the meaning of Doe? Despite the many fundamental
questions of constitutional law which the Supreme Court left
unanswered, its affirmance in Doe leads inescapably to five con-
clusions: First, Griswold is an insufficient doctrinal basis to sup-
port arguments for a substantive right of sexual privacy indiscri-
minately shielding the private acts of consenting adults from gov-
ernment scrutiny; second, the Burger Court is not prepared to
create, either by extending the rationale of Griswold or by use of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a per se
right of sexual privacy for consenting adults as distinguished from
a right of privacy which the Court has already conceded to exist
in certain matters surrounding the begetting of offspring;" third,
" Doe represented the first time the Supreme Court had been compelled to scrutinize
the constitutionality of a typical state sodomy statute since Eisenstadt. Consequently
much was at stake here, and presumably the parties spared no resources in preparing their
written submissions for the Court. Nevertheless, briefs filed with the Supreme Court in
Doe reflect little more than a careful distillation of those arguments that have previously
carried the day for their respective positions, and neither side added appreciably to the
body of constitutional theories that have developed around the sodomy question since
Eisenstadt. See Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement and Appellees' Motion to Dismiss,
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
The Supreme Court recognized a constitutional "right to procreate" in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). That a person has a fundamental, personal interest in
procreation or matters related to procreation has distinctly colored Supreme Court deci-
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outside the context of state contraceptive laws, Eisenstadt is of
little or no doctrinal value as a nexus linking unmarried persons
to the right of privacy secured for the marital relationship in
Griswold; fourth, assuming that Griswold provides a total right
of sexual privacy for consenting married persons, as most courts
which have considered the question now concede, a state sodomy
statute which exempts married couples but subjects unmarried
persons to prosecution sets up a legitimate classification that does
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment; and finally, regulation of sodomy among consenting un-
married adults remains a legitimate exercise of a state's police
power to legislate for the maintenance of public morality, and the
Supreme Court will continue to defer to legislative judgments in
this area.
For every conclusion that reasonably can be extracted from
Doe, a more nagging question remains: Has a majority of the
Court decided to draw strict new limits around Griswold as a
constitutional source for a right of privacy in varying contexts,
thereby restricting Griswold's future power to sustain decisions
such as Roe v. Wade?"9 Is Eisenstadt forever confined to the nar-
row circumstances of discriminatory state contraceptive laws?
Has the Court elevated to the level of constitutional principle
Justice Goldberg's dictum in Griswold, wherein he spoke of the
state's power to regulate "sexual promiscuity,"90 and Justice
Harlan's dictum in Poe v. Ullman, wherein he inveighed against
"homosexuality" and other "intimacies which the law has always
sions involving individual sexual matters such as Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is precisely for this reason that the important Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Roe trilogy has often worked not to the benefit, but to the detriment, of parties
challenging the constitutionality of sodomy statutes. Central to these three cases is the
matter of begetting children. Arguments on the validity of sodomy statutes, on the other
hand, ask the court to endorse a person's interest in pure sexuality apart from the tradi-
tional aspects of procreation. The Court has shown its willingness to protect one interest,
but not the other.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), would appear to be a strong constitutional
source for arguments that consenting adults enjoy a fundamental right of sexual privacy.
But the Court has stoutly refused to use Stanley as a doctrinal springboard for reaching
new areas of constitutionally protected privacy, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351
(1971); United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), and the decision continues
to languish within the narrow factual confines of the right to possess obscene material in
the home.
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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forbidden"?"' Would the Court have held differently if the consti-
tutional challenge in Doe had been brought by two heterosexuals,
married or unmarried, instead of two homosexuals?
Whatever the case, appeal to the Supreme Court is at present
not a viable course for unmarried persons who wish to challenge
the constitutionality of state sodomy statutes on the grounds they
invade a fundamental right of privacy, deny a due process right
to be let alone, or violate equal protection of the laws. To embark
on such litigation flies in the face of virtually all case history since
Griswold. And if one message rings clearly through the Supreme
Court's silence in Doe, it is that review of such statutes will re-
main foreclosed for at least the next several years. The real
battleground has now shifted to state courts and state assemblies,
where judges and legislators have the power to achieve, as a mat-




367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Conceivably Congress could exercise its still largely untested power under § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment to enact legislation establishing an indiscriminate right of
sexual privacy among consenting adults. This prospect, of course, is quite unlikely. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). But see Mitchell v. Oregon, 400 U.S. 112
(1970).
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